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et al.: Double Jeopardy
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

No person shall be... subject for the same offense to be twice
put injeopardy of life or limb ....

N.Y. CoNST. art. I, § 6.
No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense ....

COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Latham'
(decided December 17, 1997)
The New York State Court of Appeals unanimously reversed
the order of the Appellate Division, Third Department, and
remitted the case to the Appellate Division for an evaluation of
the facts. 2 On appeal from the trial court, the Appellate Division
reversed defendant's conviction of first degree manslaughter. 3
Defendant asserted "that because he was never advised that his
plea allocution could be used against him in a subsequent murder
trial, such use of the allocution constituted reversible error." 4 In
addition, defendant contended "that the prosecution for murder in6

the second degree

violates

statutory5 and

constitutional

190 N.Y.2d 795, 689 N.E.2d 527, 666 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1997).
2Id. at 799, 689 N.E.2d at 529, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
3 Id. at 798, 689 N.E.2d at 528, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
4 People v. Latham, 234 A.D.2d 864, 652 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dep't 1996).
5 People v. Latham, 83 N.Y.2d 233, 237-38, 631 N.E.2d 83, 84-85, 609
N.Y.S.2d 141, 142-43 (1994) (holding that defendant's statutory claim falls
within the statutory "delayed death" exemption, only the constitutional
contentions need be addressed). See also CRI. PROC. LAw. § 40.20(2)(d)
(McKinney 1992). This section authorizes a second prosecution when:
One of the offenses is assault or some other offense resulting
in physical injury to a person, and the other offense is one of
homicide based upon the death of such person from the same
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protections against double jeopardy." 7 However, the Court of
Appeals held that defendant's plea allocutions were presumptively
voluntary and should not have been subject to judicial review
from the Appellate Division. 8 The court reasoned that because
defendant failed to make a timely motion to withdraw his plea,
the plea was presumptively voluntary which allowed the
prosecution to use the plea allocution during the defendant's
murder trial. 9 In addition, the court further reasoned that the
Fifth Amendment would only apply if defendant's statements
were the result of legal compulsion.' 0
On May 18, 1990, defendant stabbed and strangled Marie
Shambeau when she informed him that she was going to end their
relationship. 1' Following his indictment, defendant plead guilty
to the charge of attempted murder in the second degree and was
subsequently sentenced to serve between seven and one half and
twenty-two and one-half years imprisonment.' 2 Seven weeks
after defendant's incarceration, Marie Shambeau died and
defendant was thereafter indicted and charged with second degree
murder.13 The trial court dismissed the indictment on double

jeopardy grounds; however, the Appellate Division, Third
Department, reversed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment

physical injury, and such death occurs after a prosecution for
the assault or other non-homicide offense.
Id.

6 U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . " Id. N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense .... " Id.
7 Latham, 83 N.Y.2d at 237, 631 N.E.2d at 84, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
8 People v. Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 799, 689 N.E.2d 527, 528, 666
N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (1997).
9

Id.
10 Id.

" Id. at 795, 689 N.E.2d at 527, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
12 id.
13 Id.
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and the Court of Appeals affirmed.' 4 During the trial, the
prosecution used defendant's plea allocutions that were made to
the attempted murder charge.15 On appeal, the Appellate
Division held that defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
had not been waived. 16 Moreover, because the defendant did not
understand the direct consequences of his plea, such as the
possibility that his victim Shambeau may die which would allow
his colloquy to be used against him, the Appellate Division
reversed the trial court." The Court of Appeals reasoned that
"'[a] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a
defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and its consequences.""8
In People v. Ford,19 defendant pled guilty to manslaughter in
the second degree for the shooting death of his girlfriend.20
Defendant put a gun to her head and pulled the trigger believing
that the bullets were removed from the gun.2' However, the gun
fired, killing his girlfriend instantly.22 Because defendant was a
legal alien, he had deportation proceedings brought against him as
a result of the conviction involving moral turpitude.2
Consequently, defendant filed a motion requesting the court to
change its judgment from manslaughter to criminally negligent
homicide hoping to evade deportation based on the morality
issue. 24 The court responded by granting the motion, however,
only to vacate his plea and order a new trial.25 The trial court
14 id.

"At trial, the People introduced factual admissions made by defendant
during the attempted murder plea allocution." Id. at 798, 689 N.E.2d at 528,
666 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
15 Id.

16 id.

17 1d.

1 Id. (quoting People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 402-03, 657 N.E.2d 265,
267, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (1995)).
19 86 N.Y.2d 397, 657 N.E.2d 265, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1995).
20 Id. at 402, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
21 Id.
2 Id.

2 Id.
24Id.
25

d.
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held that even if defendant's statement to the court was one not
involving moral turpitude, he should be advised that a deportation
risk still exists.26 The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated
the conviction holding that "under the doctrine of collateral
consequences the court was not obligated to warn defendant of
possible deportation before accepting his plea .... 27

The

Appellate Division recognized a "distinction between
consequences of which the defendant must be advised, those
which are 'direct,' and those of which the defendant need not be
advised, 'collateral consequences." 28 The Court of Appeals held
that there was no obligation to inform a defendant of any
collateral consequences of his plea, including deportation.29
In determining whether a defendant's plea was voluntary, the
Latham court stated that even though defendant must be informed
of direct consequences, his plea is considered voluntary and
intelligent without being informed of collateral consequences. °
The Latham court further noted that unlike the defendant in Ford,
defendant did not move to vacate the judgment of conviction nor
did he challenge the voluntariness of his plea before sentencing in
a timely manner. 3 Additionally, the court stated that "[i]f
defendant had successfully moved to withdraw or to set aside the
plea to attempted murder as involuntary, the allocution could not
have been used against defendant in the later trial." 32
In People v. Moore,33 the New York Court of Appeals held that
it would be unfair to allow the prosecution to use withdrawn
26Id.
27 Id.

u id. at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 267, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 272. "A direct
consequence is one which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on defendant's punishment. . .

."

Id.

29Id.
at

405, 657 N.E.2d at 269, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
o People v. Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 799, 689 N.E.2d 527, 528, 666
N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (1997).
31 id.

32 Id. (citing People v. Moore, 66 N.Y.2d 1028, 489 N.E.2d 1295, 499
N.Y.S.2d 393 (1985)). See also People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 634
N.E.2d 199, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1994); Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 799, 689
N.E.2d at 528, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
3366 N.Y.2d 1028, 489 N.E.2d 1295, 499 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1985).
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admissions made at plea allocution, either for People's direct or
for impeachment purposes, because that "is not something the
People have bargained for and would be decidedly unfair to the

defendant."'

Therefore, "[i]n the absence of such a motion,

however, the plea and the resulting conviction of attempted
murder are presumptively voluntary, valid and not otherwise

subject to collateral attack.""
In United States v. Broce,36 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the New York Court of Appeals' decision holding "that
the double jeopardy challenge is foreclosed be the guilty pleas
and the judgments of conviction. " 3 The Court stated that the

Court of Appeals erred by allowing respondent's guilty plea to go
only toward the "acts" of the crime and not toward the "crime"
itself which allowed the court to "[misapprehend] the nature and

effect of the plea." 38 Furthermore, the Court noted that, for
respondents to have plead guilty to two conspiracies, an
indictment does not have to allege that two different and separate
conspiracies existed, as it was enough for the indictments to
allege that only two separate agreements existed, upon which the
34Id.
at

1030, 489 N.E.2d at 1296, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
3 Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 799, 689 N.E.2d at 528, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
(citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989)). "'[I]t is well
settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused
person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally
attacked.'" Broce, 488 U.S. at 574 (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
504, 508 (1984)). "That principle controls here. Respondents have not called
into question the voluntary and intelligent character of their pleas, and
therefore are not entitled to the collateral relief they seek." Id. at 574.
36 488 U.S. 504 (1984). Respondents were indicted twice and pled guilty to
two charges of conspiracy to rig constructions bids "in violation of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1." Id. at 565.
' Id. at 565. The district court, on remand, held that respondents were
charged twice for the same conspiracy and vacated both the judgments and the
sentences that were related to the second indictment. Id. at 568. On appeal,
the New York Court of Appeals noted that now, because of an intervening
decision, double jeopardy is now considered waivable. Id. However, the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding stating "that the
guilty pleas in this case did not themselves constitute such waivers." Id. at
568-69.
381d. at 570.
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Moreover, respondents had ample

opportunity to attack the sufficiency and content of the
indictments before pleading and show that there existed only one

conspiracy. 4'

However, by foregoing their rights, respondents

41
were without the right to posit that they lie in double jeopardy.
Finally, the Court answered respondent's claim, that they did not
intentionally forego a double jeopardy defense because they were
unaware of its existence as a defense before pleading, by stating
that the Court's "decisions have not suggested that conscious
waiver is necessary with respect to each potential defense

relinquished by a plea of guilty." 4'
In the instant case, the Latham court found that because the
defendant failed to seek appropriate judicial procedures to review
"whether his plea was voluntary," then the Court should not
create an alternative procedure allowing the defendant to attack
his plea's voluntariness., 43
Finally, there was no Fifth
Amendment constraint against the prosecution from using
defendant's plea allocution at the defendant's murder trial because
the plea was not legally compelled, as it was presumed

voluntary.'

39 id.

40 Id. at 571.
41id.
42

Id. at 573.

41 People v. Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 799, 689 N.E.2d 527, 528, 666

N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (1997). (citing People v. Knack, 72 N.Y.2d 825, 526
N.E.2d 32, 530 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1988)). In Knack, the court held that a
judicially created remedy is not necessary to protect the defendant's due
process rights. Id. at 827, 526 N.E.2d at 33, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 542. (cf.,
People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593, 597-600 (1987) (holding that because the
statutory provisions were inadequate with respect to a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the court allowed an alternative of bringing a motion for
a writ of error coram nobis)).
44 Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 799, 689 N.E.2d at 528, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
(citing People v. Sobotker, 61 N.Y.2d 44, 47(1984) holding narrowly that:
"defendant who pleads guilty and then happens to give Grand Jury testimony
concerning the offense before sentence is imposed cannot claim to have
acquired statutory immunity from prosecution or punishment for the offense to
which he has pleaded guilty.").

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/16

6

1998

et al.: Double Jeopardy

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

As discussed, once a plea has been offered and a sentence
issued, the judgment is final and cannot be collaterally attacked
for want of facts or lack of knowledge.4" In addition, New York
courts have not recognized, with respect to double jeopardy, a
defense for a person who foregoes the opportunity to challenge an
indictment before admitting guilt to those charges.
Notwithstanding the New York courts' position on double
jeopardy, an exception has been established and recognized by
the Supreme Court.' In situations "'where the state is precluded
by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into
court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that
charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to
a counseled plea of guilty.'" 47 Again, there are no significant or
distinguishing factors between the United States and New York
Constitutions with respect to the courts' disposition of a double
jeopardy issue.
People v. Vasquez4 8
(decided March 20, 1997)
In February 1994, Vasquez was incarcerated at the Elmira
Correctional Facility.4 9 During a routine metal detector search,

corrections officer's saw Edwin Vasquez throw a metal object
into a laundry basket.5 0 The object that was recovered by the
correction officers was a sharpened piece of metal, commonly
known as a shank .5 During the time of the incident, "Vasquez
was serving an indeterminate sentence of five to ten years for
criminal possession of a controlled substance and a concurrent
Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 798-99, 689 N.E.2d at 527-28, 666 N.Y.S.2d at
557-58.
46 See Broce, 488 U.S. at 574.
47 d. at 575 (citing Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (quoting Menna
4n

v. New York, 423 U.S. at 62 (1975)).
4889

49 1d.

N.Y.2d 521, 678 N.E.2d 482, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1997).
at 525, 678 N.E.2d at 484, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 872.

5 Id.
51 Id.
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